these penalties are imposed by executive officers on the basis of their own findings of fact after administrative hearings where jury trials are normally not constitutionally required.' In most of these proceedings, any question of a right to trial by jury is satisfied by provision for a de novo trial in federal court on application of the losing party. 4 However, Congress has granted more and more agencies the power to impose money sanctions subject only to limited judicial review. 5 With the growing number of cases being heard by these agencies and the recent recommendation of the Administrative Conference of the United States that judicial review of other administrative adjudications be similarly limited, 0 it is important to determine how far Congress may go in limiting defendants' rights to trial by jury by delegating adjudicative authority to the executive branch.
carried proposed penalties of almost $9 million. See Comment, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: An Overview, 9 GONZAOA L. REv. 477, 491 (1974) . For a discussion of OSHA, see notes 19-39 infra and accompanying text. Ry. v. United States, 236 F. 433, 433-34 (8th Cir. 1916) (Post Office) .
Several of the states also have statutory schemes allowing administrative imposition of fines subject to only limited judicial review. E.g., Illinois Environmental Protection Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, H9 1041, 1042 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975) ; N.Y. INs. LAW § 95 (McKinney Supp. 1974) ; see Old Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Thacher, 12 N.Y.2d 48, 186 N.E.2d 554, 234 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1962) .
In general, administrative resolution of issues of fact must be sustained if supported by substantial evidence. The Occupational Safety and Health Act, for example, provides that the OSHRC's findings, "if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive." 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970) . Discussions of the application of the substantial evidence rule can be found in L. JAFFE at 600 and K. DAvis § 29.02, 29.03.
Recommendation 72-6: Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction in 2 RECOMMEN-
First, the nominally civil penalties were so criminal in nature that a jury trial was required in accordance with article I of the Constitution 3 and the sixth amendment.' 14 Second, if criminal procedures were inappropriate, the seventh amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases 5 was applicable. All three circuits rejected the sixth amendment argument, holding that Congress had wide discretion to design methods for enforcing its legislative policies.' 6 The seventh amendment argument was also rejected on the ground that Congress had the power to devise an administrative scheme for enforcing civil duties which precluded recourse to the judicial system. 17 The importance of these decisions is heightened by recent suggestions that OSHA's enforcement policies be used as a model for other regulatory programs.' 8 This Comment will examine the extent to which the sixth and seventh amendments limit the use of administrative forums as factfinders in proceedings to impose money penalties. After a brief review of OSHA's penalty provisions, an examination will be made of traditionally employed precedents, principles relied on in analogous areas of the law, and the functions of civil and criminal juries. The purpose of this examination will be to develop general principles for application of the sixth and seventh amendments to legislative schemes providing for administrative adjudication and imposition of money sanctions. These principles will then be used to evaluate OSHA's penalty provisions.
jury at any point in the penalty imposition procedure. Traditionally, jury determination of issues of fact is precluded under such statutory schemes because administrative proceedings are incompatible with criminal procedure, see Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402 (1938) , and are beyond the scope of the seventh amendment which is restricted to those suits once triable at common law, U.S. CONSr. amend. VII. The correctness of this traditional approach is the subject of this Comment. In OSHA, review of the OSHRC's findings is under the jurisdiction of the federal appellate courts, 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970) , which do not conduct jury trials. Moreover, review is specifically limited by the substantial evidence rule. Id. See note 5 supra. For an outline of OSHA, see notes 19-39 infra and accompanying text.
13. 'The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury;
.... " U.S. CONsr. art. m, § 2, cl. 3.
14. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed. . . ." U.S. CONsr. amend. VI.
15. "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONSr. amend. VII.
16. See Atlas Roofing 1009-12; Irey 1 1205; Beall Const. Co. v. OSHRC, 507 F.2d 1041 , 1044 (8th Cir. 1974 .
17. See Atlas Roofing 1011; Irey 1I 1218; Beall Const. Co. v. OSHRC, 507 F.2d 1041 , 1044 (8th Cir. 1974 18. See H. GoLDscHMm 901, 939; Atlas Roofing 994. [ Vol. 1976:723 OSHA PENALTY PROVISIONS OSHA was enacted in an effort to reduce the spiraling number of job-related injuries and illnesses that threaten the lives of America's workers. 19 In order to achieve this purpose, the Act provides for a comprehensive scheme of administrative regulation. Inspectors employed by the Department of Labor are authorized to visit work facilities 20 and to issue citations 2 for violations of the Act. 2 2 When violations are discovered, the Secretary of Labor may recommend four courses of action: (1) if the violation is non-serious, 2 3 a penalty of up to $1000 may be proposed; 24 (2) should the violation be serious but not willful, the Act requires a penalty of up to $1000;25 (3) if a willful or repeated violation has occurred, a penalty of up to $10,000 may be recommended; 2 " (4) finally, if a willful violation has caused the death 641, 645-46 (1974) . Indeed, surprise was valued so highly that Congress enacted criminal sanctions punishing anyone who gives advance notice of an inspection, 29 U.S.C. § 666(f) (1970).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 658 (1970) . A written citation is to "describe with particularity the nature of the violation, including a reference to the provision ... violated" and "fix a reasonable time for the abatement of the violation. " Id. § 658(a) . The inspector may also find that a violation exists but that it has no direct relationship to health or safety and issue a notice of a de minimis violation in lieu of a citation. Such violations carry no penalty. Id.
22. Citations may be issued for specific violations of standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor, see id. § § 654(a)(2), 654(b), 655, or for violations of the Act's broad general duty clause which requires an employer to "furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards . " Id. § 654(a)(1). 23. The Act defines a serious violation as one causing "a substantial probability that death or a serious physical harm could result... unless the employer did not, and could not with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the presence of the violation." Id.
§ 666(j). 24. Id. § 666(c) .
Id. § 666(b)
. The statutory definition of "serious" is set forth in note 23 supra.
Id. § 666(a).
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of an employee, a criminal prosecution may follow, with a conviction resulting in up to six months in prison and a $10,000 fine. 2 7 A citation must include a fixed period for abatement of the violation, 28 and failure to comply will subject the employer to a civil penalty of up to $1000 for each day the violation continues after the abatement period has ended. 29 All of OSHA's civil penalties are to be paid to the United States
Treasury. 0 Use of OSHA's criminal sanctions requires a conviction in an article resulting 22pm46tement notifi 11.7 0 0 1 628.4 Tm ($m46t8j 3 Tr /F5 1 Tf 11.1 0328$m46
the Commission,1 7 he may seek review of OSHRC's final order in the appropriate circuit court of appeals." Review of administrative findings of fact is limited; the Commission's findings "shall be conclusive" "if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.
3 9
SIXTH AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS
The right to a jury trial in criminal cases is guaranteed in the body of the Constitution 0 and reasserted by the Bill of Rights. 41 According to the Supreme Court, these provisions "reflect a profound judgment about the way law should be enforced and justice should be administered" so that government controls are prevented from becoming arbitrary and oppressive. 42 The right to trial by jury guaranteed to criminal defendants is one aspect of a judicial system that was carefully designed to make certain that governmental power could not go unchecked. 4 3 In order to achieve this purpose, the courts must be diligent in examining any delegation of adjudicative power to administrative agencies which may deprive individuals of the procedural protections that are guaranteed by the Constitution. 4 4 The ultimate question in determining the applicability of the sixth amendment is whether the proceeding is "penal in nature.""" Although it is frequently asserted that the distinction between civil and criminal 37. If the employer does not contest the proposed citation and/or penalty, the OSHRC's order is nonreviewable. Id. § 659(a Thacher, 12 N.Y.2d 48, 186 N.E.2d 554, 234 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1962) .
45. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167-69 (1963); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922) (alleged tax held to be a money penalty); O 'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 324 (1914) 51. This is not an unfair characterization. See Charney, supra note 47, at 480. One of the inter-house conferees who contributed to the compromises which led to the final OSHA legislation, Senator Dominick, defended the use of civil penalties during floor debate, explaining:
... we have a civil not a criminal penalty for a willful or repeated violation. That has been treated with some care. We did it this way because I think most of us know how difficult it is to get an enforceable criminal penalty in these types of cases. Over and over again, the burden of proof under a crim- RFc. 37,338 (1970) . A similar rationale was the basis for the more recent amendments to the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. § § 814, 815, 817, 822, 831, 844 (Supp. III, 1973) , amending 46 U.S.C. § § 814, 815, 817, 822, 831, 844 (1970) , which converted provisions for criminal penalties to civil penalties. See S. REP. No. 1014 , 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1972 .
52. This exception is an historic one that has been generally accepted as implicit in the concept of the right to jury which the constitutional conventions embodied in article III and the sixth amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 159-62 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379 (1966) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) . As a result, the sixth amendment has been construed to guarantee a defendant's right to counsel, his right to a speedy and public trial, a right to be informed of the accusation against him, a right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and a right to obtain compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in all criminal trials. The right to trial by jury, however, applies only where the crime is not petty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (established right to counsel in trial of petty offender).
53. See Comment, supra note 47, at 358. The importance of this point must not be underestimated. Although this issue appears to have been ignored by all of the courts which have examined the procedural constitutionality of OSHA's enforcement mechanism, the petty crime exception has the potential to resolve many of the sixth amendment challenges aimed at the unavailability of criminal juries in civil penalty cases. By holding the OSHA penalties petty, the courts can sidestep the weightier sixth amendment issue of whether or not the particular sanction is penal in nature. A finding that all pecuniary penalties, or at least relatively small money fines (maximum fines of $500 or $1000, for example), are petty could obviate any question of the right to a criminal jury (in Irey I, for instance). Where trial by jury is not required and other elements of due process are available, there is no obvious impediment to conducting a criminal proceeding outside the state or federal courts. Cf. REv. 443 (1959) .
54. See Charney, supra note 47, at 501-04; see, e.g., Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975) (discussing application of petty crime exception to a money fine for civil contempt); Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., No. 73-1137 , at 11-17 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 3, 1976 .
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making this determination-"the seriousness with which society regards the offense" and "the severity of the maximum authorized penalty"--indicates that not all money fines are necessarily petty. 55 With respect to the severity of the maximum authorized penalty, decisions have generally begun with the statutory definition of a petty offense"s as " [a] ny misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of more than six months, or a fine of not more than $500, or both. . .. 517 Just as the Supreme Court has construed this definition so as to find a petty offense when no more than six months imprisonment is at issue, 58 the statutory language suggests that a petty offense will exist where the potential fine does not exceed $500."5
While recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that there is nothing thaumaturgic about the $500 figure and that classification of monetary fines will vary according to their effect on a given defendant, 60 it seems clear that not all money fines will necessarily be classified as petty.
This view is supported by the increasingly serious offenses now being punished by monetary sanctions. 61 Pettiness has never been a 55. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970) ; Douglass v. First Nat'! Realty Corp., No. 73-1137 , at 11-14 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 3, 1976 Corp., No. 73-1137 , at 14-15 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 3, 1976 .
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1970) . A misdemeanor is defined as any offense that is not a felony, id. § 1(2), and a felony is any offense made "punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," id. § 1(1).
58. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) ("[N] o offense can be deemed petty for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized"); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1966) .
59. See Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., No. 73-1137 , at 17 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 3, 1976 ; United States v. R.L. Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1971) (holding that where a corporation was vulnerable to a fine of over $500, the fine was not petty). There is a historical argument that the sixth amendment was never intended to cover sanctions where only property, not personal liberty, is at stake, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 45 n.2 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Kaye, supra note 52, at 274-77; see H. GOLDSCHMID 915. But see Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975) . Such a view seems unreasonable in view of the increasingly large money penalties imposed and the increasingly serious offenses which they are used to sanction.
60. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975) ; Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., No. 73-1137 , at 15-17 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 3, 1976 rigidly fixed concept. 62 Its dimensions vary from generation to generation so that "a penalty once thought to be mild may come to be regarded as so harsh as to call for the jury" even where it was not available in similar cases when the Constitution was adopted. 6 3 Certainly, as the prisons become more crowded and the opposition to imprisonment as unnecessary and ineffective continues to mount, Congress and the courts will rely more and more heavily on monetary sanctions to punish serious offenses. Such punishments should not be classified as petty unless they actually fit the traditional conception of a petty crime as an act "which [does] not offend too deeply the moral purposes of the community, and [is] stigmatized by punishment relatively light." 6 4 Only by carefully applying these factors on a case-by-case basis can the sixth amendment right to trial by jury remain an effective check against unjust government regulation.
Application of these general principles suggests that a further inquiry into the primary nature of OSHA's penalty provisions is in order. The relatively harsh penalty for willful violations 65 and the grave nature of the conduct which constitutes a serious offense 66 make it doubtful that these classes of violations could properly be characterized as petty. While the penalty for non-serious violations 67 might be classified as petty, enabling a sanction to be imposed summarily, it is still necessary to consider whether or not that sanction is penal, for if it is not, its pettiness is irrelevant and the procedure for imposition must still surmount a seventh amendment challenge. Determination of whether a given proceeding is in fact penal in nature has historically hinged upon a distinction between a wrong done to an individual and a wrong done to the public. 69 This contrast malum in se and therefore required right to trial by jury despite defendant's vulnerability to maximum penalty of only $100 or 30 days in jail between the criminal and civil law is epitomized by the classification of contempt proceedings. While either form of contempt may result in incarceration, the object of the different proceedings is quite distinct:
A proceeding for civil contempt has as its object remedial punishment by way of a coercive imprisonment, or a compensatory fine, payable to the complainant. A proceeding for criminal contempt seeks punishment to vindicate the authority of the court.
70
The purpose of civil contempt and its sanctions is to benefit the individual rather than the state by compelling the wrongdoer to comply with the law as established by the court. 7 ' Criminal contempt is designed to this distinction. There the Court relied upon a classification developed by Blackstone which distinguished between private wrongs involving the infringement of rights belonging to the individual and public wrongs which involve a violation of public rights and duties which benefit the community as a whole. Id. at 668-69, citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. Thus, according to the early cases, whether an action was penal in nature depended on "whether the wrong to be redressed is a wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual. " Id. at One possible exception to the general applicability of the public/private distinction as a method of determining whether a statute is penal or civil in nature is found in recent environmental legislation protecting wildlife. Wild animals have traditionally belonged to all the citizens of a country in their collective capacify. As the representative of this collective, the government has the authority to exercise control over wild animals as a trust for the benefit of its citizens. "Implicit in this power was the right to regulate or absolutely prohibit the taking of or traffic in, animals ferae naturae, if such action was deemed necessary for the protection or preservation of the public good." Flemming v. 'United States, 352 F.2d 533, 536 (Ct. Cl. 1965 385, 399-403 (1948) . This being the case, the state or federal government may be considered to own the endangered species and other wild animals which it chooses to protect, in which case a civil action may be appropriate to protect a private right even though it is exercised for the public good. Such an argument might justify the use of civil fines in such legislation as the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1375(a) (Supp. III, [Vol. 1976:723 protect the public interest by deterring particular conduct and punishing its occurrence. 72 The distinction provides the basis for determining the constitutional protections that must be afforded an individual charged with contempt.
73
The modem approach for determining whether a particular penalty brings the sixth amendment into play was formalized by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. At issue in that case was the constitutionality of provisions of the Nationality Act which provided for involuntary expatriation, without hearing, of persons leaving the United States to avoid a wartime draft. 75 In holding that the Act violated the sixth amendment, 76 the Court announced a two-step test to aid in the resolution of future sixth amendment questions. 7 7 First, whenever possible, legislative purpose must be construed from "objective manifestations" contained in the legislative history of the provision; 18 however, if such an inquiry does not produce "conclusive evidence of the legislative aim," an objective appraisal of the statute itself must be made. (Supp. III, 1973) .
Use of such an exception would be severely limited. While a similar argument might be made in support of civil penalties for pollution control violators, precedent does not support such an argument. When the wrong is an undifferentiable injury to the interests (as opposed to the property) of the general public, the appropriate action has generally been one for public nuisance, exposing the individual responsible to criminal liability.
72 (D. Hawaii 1955) . "Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense; it is a violation of the law, a public wrong which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both." Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194, 201 (1968) ; Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-71 (1966) . See also R. PEPRINS, supra note 70, at 533-34. 73. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198-202 (1968) (established sixth amendment right to trial by jury in criminal contempt proceedings); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U. S. 364, 368-71 (1966). 74. 372 U.S. 144 (1963) . A similar analysis had previously been used in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612-21 (1960) (termination of deported aliens' old age benefits held not to require a trial with all the incidents of the sixth amendment).
75. See Nationality Act of 1940 § 401(j), 58 Stat. 746 (1944) , and its successor and counterpart, Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 349(a) (10), 66 Stat. 163, 267-68 (1952 The analysis is designed to determine whether the legislative aim in providing a sanction was to punish an individual for unlawful conduct or to regulate the conduct in question. 80 Thus, in order for a civil money penalty to pass the test of Mendoza-Martinez, it must have a legitimate remedial purpose. 8 That is, it must either compensate an injured party for a loss or serve to abate a hazard which violates the law.
Compensatory Penalties
It has long been recognized that compensation of the government for its injuries is a legitimate function of the civil law. 2 Reimbursement for loss is the normal civil remedy for a private injury.
3
While the situation may seem somewhat different when the injured party is the government and has legislated its compensation in advance, Congress' authority to fix appropriate fines for private injuries is firmly established, 4 and that power exists whether the wrong committed is against the government or against a private individual. 8 Despite their relative severity, the Court has consistently refused to invalidate such sanctions unless the measure of recovery fixed by Congress is unreasonably excessive. 8 6 Thus, the power to tax puts the government and the Congress' power to set compensation for injury to the government is closely analogous to the prerogative of private parties to bind themselves through liquidated damage clauses designed to set reasonable damages for injuries which will be difficult to evaluate in money terms; see id. at 151; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-718; 148, 154 (1956) . The contractual rationale justifies the use of civil sanctions by two of the administrative agencies which are presently authorized to impose penalties subject to only limited judicial review. The Post Office is presently authorized to penalize its carriers for failure or refusal to transport the mail without invoking the power of the courts. See 39 U.S.C. § § 5206, 5603, 5604 (1970) . The validity of these provisions is well settled by the courts. Allman v. United States, 131 U.S. 31, 35 (1889); Great Northern Ry. v. United States, 236 F. 433, 433-34 (8th Cir. 1916) . These statutory provisions are analogous to liquidated damages and are incidents of the relationship between the government and another contracting party. See note 85 supra.
A more recent illustration of this rationale is found in the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's (FHLBB) authority to impose penalties on banks involved in the home loan bank program or insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. 12 U.S.C. § 1425a(d) (1970) (penalty for a deficiency under the Act's liquidity requirements). In return for loans and/or insurance the banks agree to comply with the regulation authorized by the Act. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1424, 1430 (1970) with 12 U.S.C. § 1425a(d) (1970) . "The counsel of the FHLBB reported that 'there has never been a court appeal' but that 'review would be limited to considering whether the Board had acted arbitrarily or capriciously.'" H. GOLDSCHMID 952 n.5.
90. E.g., 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1970) (penalties for violations by broadcast licensees). The license or permit subjects its holders to certain responsibilities inherent in the license. See id.
Professor Jaffe has commented on the utility of such combinations of licensing and fining powers: 'To be sure, when the revocation power is conferred on an agency, it may be advisable to confer a fining power as well. This reduces the pressure on the agency to use the revocation power in marginal cases." L JAFFE 114.
91. Cf. Carrington, Civilizing University Discipline, 69 MICH. L. REv. 393, 409-10 (1971) . Vol. 1976:7231 in primarily compensatory penalties are consistent with the normal mechanisms of the civil law. 92 Though normally associated with the criminal sanction, deterrence is certainly not unknown to the civil law's arsenal of remedies. Not only does compensation itself typically contain a punitive aspect, 93 but both exemplary and multiple damages have been accepted as valid components of the civil law despite their essentially punitive natures. 4 Where private recovery for particular conduct is typically accompanied by punitive damages, there is no reason why Congress should not take this fact into account when setting penalties for similar wrongdoing perpetrated against the government. 95 In gener-92. The leading case in this area is Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) where the Court rejected arguments that a statute assessing a 50% addition to fraudulent tax deficiencies, Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 293(b), 45 Stat. 791, was penal in nature. According to the Court, the penalty was a remedial sanction designed "primarily as a safeguard for the protection of the revenue and to reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer's fraud." 303 U.S. at 401. This holding clearly approves a deterrent element-the penalty is supposed to protect the revenue by providing a fear of loss that will deter tax fraud.
This interpretation of Mitchell as approving some deterrent effects in an essentially remedial statute is supported by the authority cited in support of the holding. The size of the penalty provided in Mitchell also supports this position. See note 86 supra. It has been pointed out that such a large penalty is unrelated to investigative expenses and losses. Gellhorn, supra note 49, at 273-74 n.21; H. GOLDSCHMD 914-15. That interpretation is borne out by comparing the 50% penalty still imposed for willful violations, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6653(b) , with the penalty now allowed for negligent tax evasion. Id. § 6653 (a).
93. Requiring any wrongdoer to compensate his victim will, in a sense, punish the wrongdoer. It is the nature of the action as a whole that determines whether it is remedial or penal. See Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 155-58 (1899) .
94. Although it is clear that their purpose is to punish wrongdoers and to deter wrongful conduct, punitive damages are an established element of the law of torts. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 86-90 (1897) al, criminal procedure will be required only when a penalty becomes so punitive that its primary purpose can no longer be characterized as compensatory 6 
Regulatory Sanctions
Sanctions which fulfill a legitimate regulatory function may also be sustained against constitutional objections even where highly punitive effects are apparent. In Telephone News System, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 9 7 a three-judge district court upheld a statute which required termination of telephone service upon the request of any law enforcement agency which had determined that the phones were being used to communicate illegal gambling information 5 Despite its acknowledgement that termination of phone service was tantamount to sentencing a business to death, 99 the district court rejected a sixth amendment challenge on the basis of conclusive evidence that the sanction was designed not to punish but to suppress the evil that was the object of the regulatory scheme. 10 0 In the court's view, any loss to the plaintiff was merely "incidental to the suppression of the business of wagering that was the intent of the statute. The proper analysis of legislative purpose is exemplified by Chief Justice Warren's pre-Mendoza opinion in Trop v. Dulles. 0 8 Trop was contesting a statute which provided for expatriation upon courtmartial conviction of desertion in time of war. The Court had to address the issue of whether the sanction was penal in nature to determine whether the eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment was applicable. The government contended that the statute, rather than being penal, was a regulatory provision authorized by the war power. 0 9 The Court rejected this contention. Allowing that regulation of deserters was among Congress' powers, the Court held that "a statute prescribing the consequence that will befall one who fails to abide by these regulatory provisions is a penal law."" 0 As a concurring Justice explained:
It is difficult, indeed, to see how expatriation of the deserter helps wage war except as it performs that function when imposed as punishment. It is obvious that expatriation cannot in any wiso avoid the harm apprehended by Congress. After the act of desertion, only punishment can follow, for the harm has been done.""' While Mendoza-Martinez clearly establishes the appropriate inquiry for determining whether a particular sanction is of such a punitive nature as to require the procedural protections of the criminal law, the courts have shown some reluctance to apply its analysis to statutory pecially in view of the purported "civil penalty" that is assessed for the proscribed activity. But to be guided in the interpretive process by such superficial implements as word classification or legal jargon truly would be an analytical pitfall in allowing form to replace substance. immigrant brought into the United States with a "loathsome or contagious disease" that could have been detected by a proper medical examniation at the time of embarkation." 8 The Secretary (or his agent) was empowered to impose the fixed penalty on the strength of his own administrative findings of fact. Relying chiefly on cases which had sustained the power of Congress to grant customs officials authority to impose money penalties for undervaluation of imported goods," 9 the Supreme Court approved this procedure while presenting a broad conception of congressional power:
[I]t [is] within the competency of Congress, when legislating as to matters exclusively within its control, to impose appropriate obligations and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of involving the judicial power. 120. 214 U.S. at 339; see Lloyd Sabaudo S.A. v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 334 (1932). The Court suggested that taxation and tariff were subject to this exclusive control. 214 U.S. at 334. Then, in upholding the legislation at issue, it explained:
As the authority of Congress over the right to bring aliens into the United States embraces every conceivable aspect of that subject, it must follow that if Congress has deemed necessary to impose particular restrictions on the com-On first reading, the broad language of Stranahan seems to disclose no limit on Congress' authority to enact administrative procedures for imposing civil money penalties. A closer reading, however, suggests that the actual bounds set forth in the opinion are much narrower than its broad language seems to imply. S. 329 (1932) , where the Supreme Court describes Congress' control over the admission of aliens once as "exclusive," id. at 334, and once as "plenary," id. at 335. As Professors Davis and Jaffe have each pointed out, if the Court's suggestion that Congress may create civil money penalties is taken seriously, congressional authority to permit administrative imposition of money penalties is boundless because of the plenary power to regulate commerce. K. DAvis § 2.13; L. JAFFE 111. Surely, although regulation of federal banks is in the national interest and within the power granted to Congress under the commerce clause, the Court would not allow administrative imposition of fines upon thieves whom an administrative law judge has found guilty of robbing federal banks. See cases cited at note 50 supra. Stranahan is clearly concerned with "exclusive," 214 U.S. at 339, or "absolute" congressional authority, id. at 342, and Elting makes no pretense of expanding that precedent, see 287 U. sive. 134 Indeed, OSHA itself contains specific provisions to encourage state action designed to facilitate occupational safety.' 3 5 Hence, OSHA's penalty provisions should not be sustained merely by reference to Congress' broad discretion to design methods to enforce its legislative policies.' 3 0 Likewise, the legislative history of OSHA does not provide the conclusive evidence required to end the sixth amendment inquiry. 3T Committee hearings and reports suggest that there was substantial dispute over the severity and intent of the Act's sanctions; 38 however, since discussion of these provisions was apparently reserved for executive session, 130 170-84 (1963) , where the Court traced the provisions in question back to 1865 and found in each segment of the legislative history a reaffirmation of congressional intent to employ its power over citizenship to punish draft evaders.
[ Vol. 1976:723 Mendoza-Martinez requires an objective assessment of OSHA's penalty provisions.
1
The Supreme Court has suggested several factors which might be useful in such an assessment:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrance, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned ....
142
When the OSHA penalty provisions are analyzed using these factors, serious questions arise as to their constitutionality. The requirements for imposing the sanction for willful violations are identical to the conventional scienter element of a crime. To prove a willful violation, the government has the burden of establishing deliberate defiance or reckless disregard of the Act,'' much as it has the burden of establishing criminal intent as an element of more traditional crimes.' 5 2 This factor weighs heavily against the argument that the sanction for willful violations is remedial. more likely under civil law standards of proof than when a jury is required to reach that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. 66 In fact, a business may be better off defending a charge under the criminal section so that constitutional protections would be clearly available. 6 ' Since they are not subject to imprisonment,' 6 8 corporate defendants have no greater vulnerability under the criminal law than they do under civil sanctions. They are faced with the same punishment in both instances, but are deprived of important procedural protections in the civil context. 69 Moreover, much of the behavior made punishable under OSHA is already a crime in that it is punishable under criminal provisions of housing and safety codes in many cities and states. 166. The potential for abuse in such a statutory scheme should be stressed. In Irey I, for example, suit was brought under § 666(a) despite the undisputed fact that an employee had been killed as a result of the alleged violation. Irey 1 1201. The issue of willfulness was contested, however, and it was undoubtedly apparent to the government that a favorable holding was more likely in an administrative proceeding where a jury would be unavailable and the standard was one of preponderance of the evidence, than in an article III court where a criminal jury would have been required to resolve the issue with reference to the more stringent "beyond-reasonable-doubt" standard. Furthermore, retributive aims are evident, particularly in the Act's sanction for willful violations. If the goal of the Act, as the Secretary of Labor contends, is "to encourage compliance with" regulations, 77 it is difficult to understand why a higher penalty is required for willful -than for non-willful violations when the same threat to public safety has 173. The difficulty with the Fifth Circuit's approach in Atlas Roofing, see note 143 supra, is most apparent in its refusal to attempt to determine any purpose other than punishment that may rationally be ascribed to the OSHA penalty provisions. See Atlas Roofing 1010. According to the court, the judiciary is unqualified to examine the appropriateness of particular sanctions in achieving the purposes of the Act. Id. See also Irey 1 1205. While this judicial respect for the legislative body's superior capacity to design solutions for social problems is laudable, the courts cannot avoid all scrutiny of the legislative inquiry. Congress may determine that a purely punitive civil sanction is the method best calculated for achieving a particular purpose, but that will not make the method constitutional. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95 (1958) . A purpose other than punishment must be rationally ascribable to the sanction before it may be deemed nonpenal. Id. at 96. In order properly to divine the nature of a sanction, the courts must look to the statute to determine the evident purpose of the legislature.
174. Authority for this approach to the statutory purpose is found in two cases in which the Court stressed that labelling cannot obscure the true intent of an act. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) (expatriation after court-martial for desertion in time of war held to be a punishment); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935) (provisions of the Revenue Act of 1926, providing for a "special income tax" of $1,000 on retail liquor dealers acting in violation of state or municipal law and imposing fines and imprisonment for failure to pay the special tax, held to be a penalty which could not be converted to a tax by mere labelling).
175. Comment, supra note 20, at 442; see Atlas Roofing 1002; Note, supra note 137, at 232. In assessing penalties, the OSHRC is required by statute to give "due consideration to the appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the business of the employer being charged, the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the employer, and the history of previous violations." OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 666(i) (1970 occurred.' Surely the extent of a hazard does not depend on whether it is the result of willful or merely negligent conduct. The effect of murder does not differ from that of manslaughter. The different penalties associated with the two crimes are merely the result of a sense that the perpetrator of one is less culpable than that of the other. Society seeks greater retribution for deeds that it senses are more wicked.
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This desire for retribution is the only credible aim of the higher penalty for willful violations.
It is possible, however, to assign a legitimate purpose to section 666(d) which authorizes a maximum penalty of $1000 per day for failure to comply with an OSHRC abatement order." 8 ' The aim of this provision differs greatly from that of OSHA's other civil penalties. The violation already exists. A penalty for non-abatement is virtually the only means available to coerce the violator to rectify the situation. The effect of such a sanction is to coerce the violator to comply with regulations, much as penalties for civil contempt are designed to coerce a party into complying with a court order.1 8 ' Rather than deterrence, 
See H. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 140 (1968).

OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 666(d) (1970).
181. See notes 69-73 supra and accompanying text. The fact that the benefit of nonabatement does not accrue to any specific individual does not detract from the remedial nature of the civil fine for non-abatement nor from the similarity between those fines and sanctions for civil contempt. OSHA's civil penalty for non-abatement typifies the kind of administrative sanction envisioned by Professor Schwenk, see notes 102-04 supra and accompanying text. The purpose of the sanction is to coerce a violator into compliance, not to deter a potential violator as is characteristic of the criminal law. Enforcement by the government is appropriate where, as here, the purpose of a sanction is to remedy a hazard before an actual injury occurs. Clearly, few individuals could afford the expense of litigating an OSHA violation before the fact of injury. Mendoza-Martinez clearly contemplates government enforcement of such nonpenal regulatory schemes. See notes 97-111 supra and accompanying text.
182. The Third Circuit has explicitly recognized the validity of civil penalties like section 666(d), which are designed to coerce compliance with regulations. In Irey I, the three-judge panel explained that "a deliberate and conscious refusal to abate a hazardous condition may bring about a situation where a heavy civil penalty might be needed to effect compliance with safety standards." Irey 1 1204.
The problem with Irey I is that the court appeared to apply this principle to the provision sanctioning willful violations, 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1970), a provision conditioned on the willful violation of the Act, not on a refusal to abate a hazard. The large [Vol. 1976:723 
ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES SEVENTH AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS
Even when it is determined that imposition of a statutory sanction does not require the procedural protections associated with the criminal law, federal administrative adjudications may still be inappropriate unless accompanied by some provision for plenary judicial review.
183
The seventh amendment requirement that "the right to trial by jury. . . be preserved" in significant "[s]uits at common law"'t plates an important limit on the extent to which civil penalties can be administratively imposed' 8 5 without provision for de novo review in district court. 86 Even where Congress has the power to delegate adjudicative authority to an administrative agency, the seventh amendment may restrict the use of such a forum as a finder of fact when the issue in controversy is in the nature of a suit at common law.1 8 7
The seventh amendment right to trial by jury represents a constitutional decision concerning "the preferable mode of disposing of issues of penalty is designed to deter conduct by punishing its occurrence. The sanction for non-abatement is a method of coercing compliance.
183. It should be stressed from the outset that the seventh amendment right to trial by jury affects only federal administrative schemes since the Court has consistently refused to apply the seventh amendment to the States. 186. If the seventh amendment does require that trial by jury be available, only a plenary trial in district court will satisfy that requirement. See L. JAFFE 90. Contra, Irey II. This has been the thrust of the recent seventh amendment challenges to OSHA, which were directed not to the Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission's adjudicatory powers, but to the fact that the only judicial review which the Act permitted of the administrative agency's factual findings was limited by the substantial evidence test. fact in civil cases at law.""" 8 The absence of any provision protecting jury trials in civil cases was one of the most serious objections voiced by opponents of the original Constitution' 9 who believed that the jury was an essential guardian of political and civil liberty. 190 The seventh amendment was designed to act as a check against corruption, arbitrariness, and undue influence of wealth in the courtroom.' 9 ' Adherence to the federal policy favoring jury trials 92 is nowhere more important than where the government is authorized to use the civil law to enforce its own regulations. 193 In such cases, the amendment's function parallels that of the constitutional provisions for trial by jury in criminal casesprevention of oppressive government regulation.' 9 4
The concept of a "suit at common law" is central to any analysis of the applicability of the seventh amendment. While early cases appeared to limit the requirement of a civil jury to actions triable under common law rules as they existed when the seventh amendment was adopted in 1791,1 9 t later decisions have made it clear that a statutory right of action which involves legal rights carries the same seventh amendment guaranment challenges to OSHA have been limited to the ground that the narrow scope of review allowed under the Act abrogates the individual's right to trial by jury, Irey II 1215; see Atlas Roofing 1011-12, and it should be emphasized that since it is the right to a jury, not the exercise of power, that is at issue, the mere presence of the judicial power in the enforcement scheme will not satisfy the amendment. But see Irey II 1214. 188 tee as its common law counterpart. 19 6 Where legislation provides for the enforcement of statutory rights and remedies analogous to those recognized at common law in "an ordinary civil action in district court," the seventh amendment requires that a jury trial be made available. 197 Thus, there is little question that any original judicial imposition of a statutory money penalty will entitle the defendant to trial by jury, regardless of whether the particular sanction existed at common law in 1791.98 196. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1974) ("The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory rights . . ."); United States v. J.B. Williams, Inc., 498 F.2d 414, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1974); see Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374-76 (1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970) , citing Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830 ). 197. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-97 (1974) ; United States v. J.B. Williams, Inc., 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974) .
Several situations should be distinguished. First, if a statute makes specific provision for trial by jury, the courts must respect that mandate regardless of whether a jury would have been constitutionally required. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 64-67 (1924) ; J. MOORE 1 38.1211] at 128.24. Second, if a statute is silent on the issue of trial by jury, the rights of action and proceeding must be analogized to their historical counterparts to determine whether the Constitution requires that trial by jury be available. Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9, 27-28 (1913); see, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974 According to the recent cases, this determination of whether an issue is of such a legal nature as to require a right to trial by jury depends on a consideration of the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions, the remedy sought, and the practical abilities and limitations of juries. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n. 10 (1970); Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110 , 1116 -17 (7th Cir. 1972 , affd sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) .
If any legal claim is presented, the opportunity for trial by jury must be afforded regardless of its combination with issues formerly adjudicated by a court of equity unless grave and unusual circumstances are presented. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959) . See note 230 infra.
A third situation arises where Congress enacts a statutory scheme which provides a new cause of action and a mode of enforcement that seems to preclude trial by jury. In this case, the legislation must be examined to determine whether it is violative of the seventh amendment. J. MOORE 7 38.37 [3] at 308.4; see, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966) . Recent cases have clarified the mode of analysis for making this determination when the litigation is committed to a district court, Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974) DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1976:723 De Novo Review and the Seventh Amendment
The more difficult seventh amendment issue concerns the constitutionality of legislative schemes which preclude jury resolution of factual disputes by delegating adjudicative responsibility to administrative officials.1 0 Some authorities seem to have relied on the notion that trial by jury is incompatible with the concept of administrative adjudication to argue that all proceedings before an administrative agency are exempted from the seventh amendment. 00 While this "administrative proceeding exception" may be defensible when the question is whether an administrative forum must employ a jury as a finder of fact, 21 it cannot justify the complete derogation of the constitutional right to a civil jury in common law cases. 20 2 The seventh amendment is an important constraint on the kinds of civil actions that can be resolved conclusively by administrative officers. 20 3 When an administrative sanction is in the meshed in a statute. The right to trial by jury in an action for debt still prevails whatever modem name may be applied to the action. (1970) . See note 11 supra. Largely because of the lack of such schemes, see note 5 supra, this issue has rarely been analyzed by the courts and does not appear to have been authoritatively resolved except in a few narrow situations. For example, it seems clear that the Government and another party can agree in contract to give an administrative agency final authority to impose penalties that are in the nature of liquidated damages. See note 89 supra; see Irey 1 1214 n.10 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Similarly, the liquidated damages theory may give an administrative agency authority to impose penalties on its licensee as a condition of the license. See note 90 supra. It should be emphasized, however, that such powers are unrelated to the kinds of money penalties present in OSHA where the Government has no specific prior relationship with a particular business. The power of some agencies to deny or revoke a license-a privilege which is regulated on behalf of Congress-is quite distinct from the power to impose a penalty on any member of the public. See L. JAFFE 111. But see Atlas Roofing 1012.
Finally, it should be noted that the "exclusive power" doctrine established in Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909) , see notes 117-33 supra and accompanying text, may also serve to exempt some administrative sanctions from the seventh amendment. See Irey 1 1209-12 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 30, at 548-49 nn.47-49. Stranahan, however, would appear to be distinguishable since it was decided under admiralty jurisdiction, see Irey I 1208-11 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) .
200. See generally Atlas Roofing 1011; Irey 1 1216-17; Note, supra note 185, at 282. Professor Jaffe's comment that "the concept of expertise on which the administrative agency rests is not consistent with the use by it of a jury as fact finder," L. JAFFE 90, has been frequently cited by the courts and commentators. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 n.8 (1974) ; Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 , 84 HAv. L. Rnv. 1109 , 1267 n.390 (1971 ). 201. See Beall Const. Co. v. OSHRC, 507 F.2d 1041 , 1044 (8th Cir. 1974 refused to apply the seventh amendment to a variety of statutory schemes which permit administrative and judicial officers to render money judgments at their discretion as part of an equitable remedy designed to restore the partirs to the positions they would have held had the statute not been violated. 212 The money award is considered to be in the nature of restitution, an equitable remedy which does not entitle the parties to trial by jury. 13 Most money penalties, however, are a necessary consequence of a finding that a violation has occurred and have no relationship to the wrongful gains or losses of any party. 21 4 For administrative penalty proceeding on the theory that it is an equitable measure in the nature of restitution. Another theory that has been offered in support of administrative imposition of civil money penalties relies on a distinction between purely private actions and actions infused with a public interest. According to this argument, an action initiated by a public official may result in a money judgment without an opportunity for trial by jury when the action is aimed at the vindication of a "public right." 21 5 Besides the obvious problem of distinguishing between public and private rights, 210 the difficulty with this argument is that the "public interest" put forward to overcome a seventh amendment challenge has uniformly been that of affording complete relief to the parties by restoring each to the status it would have held but for the statutory violation.
17 Thus, the money awards in this line of cases are essentially equitable remedies in the nature of restitution. 1 8 While it is true that assertion of a public right may enable Congress to delegate adjudicatory power to administrative agencies, that jurisdictional argument does not permit Congress to undercut the seventh amendment right to trial by jury in significant cases at common law. 219 Thus, the public right argument may only be used to support a broad use of equity powers in suits for restitution-suits which are quite distinct from actions for civil penalties.
Administrative Proceedings and the Seventh Amendment
Much of the dispute over the applicability of the seventh amendment to legislation which provides for administrative imposition of money penalties centers around language in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co.
0
In that case, the petitioning steel company challenged provisions of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935221 which authorized the NLRB to couple an award of backpay with a reinstatement order.
22 2 While the thrust of the attack on the statute was directed at the Act's validity as an exercise of the commerce clause, 223 the challenge did include a seventh amendment argument that an award of backpay is equivalent to a money judgment and requires provision for trial by jury. 224 The Court rejected the seventh amendment argument on two grounds: first, the award of backpay was merely incidental to the equitable relief-reinstatement-that was the gravamen of the action; this distinction between the jurisdictional and seventh amendment consequences of a "public right." See, e.g., H. GOLDSCHMID 943.
It should be noted that the case which first suggested the public right doctrine, Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855), did so in the context of a discussion of equitable rights and remedies. Murray's Lessee involved Congress' power to authorize executive officers to put a lien on the properties of a tax collector who, after an accounting, was found unable to transmit the sum he had collected to the U.S. Treasury. See Irey 1 1211 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); L. JAFFE 88-90. While a seventh amendment argument had been asserted, 59 U.S. at 273, it was not discussed by the Court. See Irey 1 1212 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). This may have been because of a standing problem stemming from the fact that the suit was brought not by the tax collector, but by remote successors to his title in certain lands, or because the seventh amendment challenge was not taken seriously since the case dealt in essence with "[t]he enforcement of the duty of a fiduciary to account," an equitable right historically outside the scope of the seventh amendment. and second, the proceeding was a "statutory proceeding" "unknown to the common law." 22 5
The difficulty with Jones & Laughlin is that the scope of its holding is unclear. The opinion may be read broadly as presenting the rule that the seventh amendment simply does not apply to any statutory scheme in which Congress has specifically provided for administrative adjudication. 21 6 On the other hand, the case may be read for the narrower principle that the amendment does not apply to an administrative proceeding in which the award of backpay is part of a scheme of equitable relief contemplated by statute; in such a situation, the action is not in the nature of a suit at common law. 227 to the seventh amendment is limited to these situations where provision for trial by jury would "substantially interfere" with the administrative agency's role in a statutory scheme-where provision for trial by jury would be inconsistent with the whole concept of administrative adjudication as embodied in the legislative blueprint at hand. 2 3 ' The test is necessarily a flexible one which must be applied on a case by case basis. Nonetheless, each administrative scheme which may infringe upon the seventh amendment must be carefully scrutinized.
232
The issue is not one of legislative convenience but of substantial necessity to the efficacy of a statutory scheme. 233 In essence, the question is not whether an administrative law judge must employ a jury as a fact finder, but whether some sort of review by a court employing a jury would be destructive bf an entire regulatory design. to trial by jury was rejected, 23 7 despite the fact that an action to recover possession was clearly recognized at common law.
38
The Court reasoned that the power to decide the facts which affected the landlordtenant relationship was so inseparable from the authority to regulate that relation that the seventh amendment could not restrict the commission's adjudicative authority once its power to regulate the relation was established.
230
The power to resolve issues of fact was deemed necessary to the efficacy of the legislative scheme.
More recently, a similar analysis was conducted in Katchen v. Landy 240 in which the Supreme Court rejected a seventh amendment challenge to a bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction to order the surrender of a voidable preference. 241 Though it clearly recognized that the essentially legal issue of preference would normally entitle a party to trial by jury in a court of law, 242 the Court refused to require the bankruptcy court to defer judgment until the creditor could complete a plenary proceeding in district court. 24 3 Rather, the Court held, the situation disclosed the kind of imperative circumstances which permit a court of equity to resolve all issues before it even though the results might be dispositive of a legal claim which would otherwise entitle the S. 363 (1974) , where the Court suggests "that the Seventh Amendment would not be a bar to a congressional effort to entrust landlord-tenant disputes, including those over the right to possession, to an administrative agency." Id. at 383. The Court is simply reaffirming the principle that legislation can establish an administrative agency to examine and alter common law relationships. Where the ability to adjudicate and enforce such quasi-legislative determinations of the relationships between parties is necessary to the success of the legislative scheme, the seventh amendment may not impede that purpose.
240. 382 U.S. 323 (1966). 241. Id. at 325. 242. Id. at 338-39. 243. Id. The petitioner argued that the bankruptcy court should be required to stay its proceedings and order the bankruptcy trustee to attempt to recover the preference by a plenary suit under 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970); in such an action, a jury trial would have been available to the petitioner. See id. at 338.
[ Vol. 1976:723 parties to trial by jury. 244 According to the Court, provision for jury trials would "dismember" the statutory scheme which Congress had designed "to secure prompt and effectual administration and settlement of the estate of all bankrupts in a limited period." 2 45 The necessity for a speedy and complete estate settlement provided the "imperative circumstances" necessary to extricate the proceeding from the requirements of the seventh amendment. 2 46 Block and Katchen each suggest the kinds of -needs which may help to justify a scheme for administrative penalty imposition that precludes an opportunity for trial by jury. The needs of technical expertise, rapid adjudication, and uniform results based on fluctuating public demands may all be considered in determining whether to remove an administrative program from the scope of the seventh amendment. 24 " Application of these considerations to administrative imposition of money penalties is necessarily difficult in the absence of a specific legislative scheme, but certain general principles can be suggested. First, civil money penalties must be considered prima facie within the seventh amendment. It should be emphasized that no one of these factors will necessarily be sufficient to move the proceeding into the domain of equity. The Supreme Court, for example, has made it quite clear that a desire for speed-a factor frequently cited in support of conclusive administrative adjudication-will only rarely be sufficient to obviate the need for trial by jury. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 384 (1974) ("[Wie reject the notion that there is some necessary inconsistency between the desire for speedy justice and the right to a jury trial.").
248. But see Irey II 1218. Unwilling to accept that the difference between a civil penalty payable to the United States and an award of backpay might have constitutional implications, the Third Circuit refused to accord any significance to the dissenter's analogy between civil fines and the common law action for debt. Compare id. with id. at 1222-24 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Irey 1 1208, 1213 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). In part, the Third Circuit's position was the result of a misreading of Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) , which the Irey majority cited in support of the proposition that the similarity between OSHA's civil penalties and an in personam money judgment obtainable only at law was not decisive of the seventh amendment issue. Irey I 1218. While Curtis did indicate that not all monetary relief would necessarily be characterized as legal, 415 U.S. at 196, that case strongly suggested that the difference between an award of backpay as part of an equitable remedy, see notes 211-14 supra and accompanying text, and other monetary awards that were traditionally offered by courts of law would be determinative in applying the seventh amendment, 415 U.S. at 195-97; see Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 370, 375 (1974) (". . . where an action is simply for the recovery . . . of a money judgment, the action is one at law." Id. at 370, quoting Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151 (1891)). While it is true that a money judgment has the same impact on an individual whether it is the result of an equitable
Application of the Seventh Amendment to OSHA
This analysis suggests that OSHA's civil penalties for willful 1 2 s and non-willful violations 25 4 may not be imposed unless the alleged violator is given an opportunity for trial by jury. 25 5 While it may be argued that these money penalties are merely incidental to the OSHA proceeding's essentially equitable purpose of ordering abatement, 25 the modem cases make it clear that the right to a jury trial of legal issues cannot be swallowed up in an equitable proceeding absent some extraordinary policy needs. 25 7 OSHA was designed to cope with a difficult problem on a national scale; 2 58 however, neither its legislative history nor independent analysis discloses any reason why an opportunity for trial by jury would be incompatible with the purpose or efficacy of the Act. 9 An opportunity for de novo review in district court is unlikely to impede the speedy resolution of issues contemplated by the Act. A wide variety of regulatory schemes presently depends on a de novo trial for the recovery of civil penalties. 26° OSHA's procedure of finalizing DATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMwINSTAm CONFERENCE OF THE UNrriED STATES 69 (1972) . These factors are consistent with many of the special needs contemplated by the case law. See notes 234-47 supra and accompanying text. They are also important in efforts to reduce the inequitable system of penalty settlements which presently results from the inability of the Department of Justice to act in concert with various administrative agencies in successfully completing the process of imposing fines on violators through the courts. See generally H. GOLDSCHMID. It is possible that this problem itself may constitute a danger to some regulatory schemes which is so severe that conclusive administrative adjudication of penalties, as in OSHA, is justified.
In general, it will take more than one of the above factors to justify removing a particular legislative scheme from the scope of the seventh amendment, See note 247 supra.
Commission orders whenever a particular step in the review process is not taken within a specified period 2 1 ' could continue to function to assure speedy disposition of contested citations without impinging on the seventh amendment.1 6 2 More importantly, application of the seventh amendment to these civil penalty provisions would not interfere with OSHA's primary purpose-the rapid abatement of hazardous working conditions. Under the Act's present provisions for judicial review, an appeal of a penalty citation does not stay the OSHRC's abatement order unless such a stay of execution is specifically ordered by the court. 26 3 This procedure maintains the OSHRC's role as an expert body that is best equipped to determine when a hazard exists and to invest the time and effort which will be necessary for abatement. On the other hand, the Commission has no particular expertise in deciding factual issues such as intent and reasonable care. These issues, which are fundamental to the imposition of OSHA's civil penalties, are frequently resolved by juries in other areas of the law.
264
The OSHRC could, however, retain its authority to order abatement and penalties for non-abatement subject to only limited judicial review. While the non-abatement penalty does constitute an in personam money judgment, its mechanics make it more nearly analogous to a contempt proceeding 66 than to the traditional suit for statutory penalties, which has historically been considered an action at common law. The purpose of the non-abatement penalty is central to the Act: it is designed to encourage remedial action by penalizing refusal to comply with a binding order. Indeed, when an OSHRC abatement order is enforced by the courts, it is done through a contempt proceeding with the penalty for non-abatement being one of the sanctions available to the court. 26 Since rapid abatement is the purpose of OSHA, and since without de novo review; most agencies are required to resort to the courts. See note 5 supra.
261. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § § 659-60 (1970) . See notes 31-39 supra and accompanying text.
262. Such an arrangement would parallel many contemporary schemes of administrative regulation, see note 260 supra, while giving the OSHRC conclusive adjudicative authority in the vast majority of cases since few individuals ever take advantage of their opportunity for de novo review. H. GOLDSCHMiD 899 (nearly 90% of all cases involving administrative penalties make no use of the opportunity for de novo review when it is available); see Irey I 1205 n.l actions for civil contempt do not entitle the accused to trial by jury, 267 the seventh amendment does not stand as a bar to administrative adjudication.
CONCLUSION
The sixth and seventh amendment rights to trial by jury have been zealously protected throughout the history of the American legal system. Their function has been to prevent unfair influence of politics, wealth, and government on the administration of our system of laws and justice. This policy cannot be easily displaced, no matter how laudable the goal. Summary administrative regulation undoubtedly has numerous advantages over the slow and often inexpert processes of the courts, but such practical considerations do not justify the constriction of constitutionally protected rights.
This Comment has sought to develop a general framework for determining when a money penalty can be administratively imposed, subject to only limited judicial review, without violating constitutional guarantees of trial by jury. The analysis has suggested that the right to jury trial will not bar administrative adjudication where the purposes of such procedures are consistent with the objective of administrative law-attaining prompt compliance with government regulations. As long as a penalty is designed to attain this compliance by compulsion rather than deterrence, civil procedure may be appropriate. Use of final administrative adjudications to impose civil money penalties which are not equitable in nature should be limited to the enforcement of specific orders where rapid adjudication is essential to effectuate a legislative policy.
